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One of many dichotomies comprising the development, implementation, and evaluation of security 
policies is that between clarity and ambiguity. Clarity suggests the need for well-defined, clear-cut, easily 
understood, and easily observable policies. Ambiguity suggests the converse. 
 
Some political commentators have castigated the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian National 
Authority and the Israeli Government for its teleological clarity--an endpoint with milestones concerning 
a final settlement. Yet one could effectively castigate the same accords for ambiguity in not 
operationalizing what is meant by, for example, Palestinian commitment in fighting terrorism. 
 
Some political commentators have supported the Good Friday agreement among political entities in 
Northern Ireland for its ambiguity in not mandating a final settlement but merely a next step comprising 
a new assembly within Northern Ireland and new arrangements among the Republic of Ireland, 
Northern Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Yet some participants are demanding an immediate 
endpoint--dismantling the arms and arms caches of the Irish Republican Army. 
 
Some political commentators have attacked the secrecy with which the North Korean Government 
develops and implements its security policies. Yet one could make a strong case that secrecy maximizes 
the number of possibilities attributed to overt actions--such as possibly constructing an underground 
nuclear weapons facility or test launching a missile. This maximization, especially entailing worst case 
scenario development and contingency planning on the part of the one remaining superpower and 
proximal governments, seems to have allowed the North Korean Government to win more chips than its 
hand might otherwise warrant, e.g., aid exemplified in oil, nuclear reactors, food, and medicine. 
 
What to make of the above discourse? The notion of clarity or ambiguity almost always being a superior 
style of security policy is probably--if not outmoded--an inaccurate one. More accurate would be the 
notion of different degrees of clarity and ambiguity within, between, and among policies for specific 
situations, participants, and observers. The latter notion is more complex than it might seem given 
communications theories' predictions about the sender communicating clarity, the receiver perceiving 
ambiguity, and the observer perceiving some mixture. So, too, cross-cultural difficulties, zeitgeists, and 
the social and historical transformations of meaning muddy the waters. Unfortunately, the abstract 
notions of clarity and ambiguity break down on close inspection of their real-world referents. And 
opportunities for even momentary attenuations of political violence and its threat may break down as 
well. (See Coudroglou, A. (1996). Violence as a social mutation. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 66, 
323-328; Durrheim, K., & Foster, D. (1997). Tolerance of ambiguity as a content specific construct. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 22, 741-750; Houran, J. (1998). Preliminary study of tolerance of 
ambiguity of individuals reporting paranormal experiences. Psychological Reports, 82, 183-187; Hudley, 
C., & Friday, J. (1996). Attributional bias and reactive aggression. American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine, 12, 75-81; Zhang, Q. (1998). Fuzziness--vagueness--generality--ambiguity. Journal of 
Pragmatics, 29, 13-31.) (Keywords: Israel, National Security Policy, Northern Ireland, North Korea, 
Palestinian National Authority.) 
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